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Was Mackenbach right?  Towards a practical political science of redistribution and health 
inequalities  
 
Abstract 
In 2010, Mackenbach reflected on England’s lack of success in reducing health inequalities between 
1997 and 2010, asserting that “it is difficult to imagine a longer window of opportunity for tackling 
health inequalities”; asking “[i]f this did not work, what will?”; and concluding that reducing health 
inequalities was not politically feasible at least in that jurisdiction.  Exploring the empirics of that 
observation offers a window into the politics of reducing health inequalities.  For purposes of future 
comparative research, I outline three (not mutually exclusive) perspectives on political feasibility, 
identify their implications for a political science of health inequalities, and explore what they mean 
for advocacy in support of reducing those inequalities.  
 
Introduction  
For the “New Labour” government of the United Kingdom (UK), elected in 1997, reducing 
inequalities in health that were related to socioeconomic position was a stated policy priority.  
Whatever the seriousness of that commitment, it was at best imperfectly achieved.  By 2007, before 
the financial crisis and subsequent recession, economically patterned health inequalities at least in 
England were, on some measures, larger than at any point since before the Great Depression of the 
1930s (Thomas, Dorling, & Smith, 2010).  Other research finds that the socioeconomic gradient in life 
expectancy as plotted against economic deprivation at the small area level became less steep 
between 1999–2003 and 2006–10, while overall life expectancy increased (Buck & Maguire, 2015, p. 
34).  However, this outcome cannot reflect the consequences of post-2010 austerity policies, 
including those described later in this article.   Further, such trends as a concentration of unhealthy 
  
behaviours at the low end of the socioeconomic spectrum may be “storing up inequalities in life 
expectancy in the future” (Buck & Maguire, 2015, p. 34), yet will not be reflected in relatively short-
term trends in health outcomes.   
Johan Mackenbach (2010, p. 1249) reflected on this lack of success in reducing health inequalities 
between 1997 and 2010 by asserting  that “it is difficult to imagine a longer window of opportunity 
for tackling health inequalities” and asked: “If this did not work, what will?”  Seeming to undermine 
this rhetorical query, he conceded that “health inequalities are the result of the cumulative impact 
of decades of exposure to health risks, some of them intergenerational, of those who live in 
socioeconomically less advantaged circumstances.”  This important observation means not only that 
reducing health inequalities “requires a massive re-allocation of societal resources” (p. 1252) but 
also that, even given a serious political commitment, 13 years might not be long enough – a point 
borne out by the importance of lagged effects1 and insights from life course epidemiology (Bartley, 
2011; Blane, Kelly-Irving, d'Errico, Bartley, & Montgomery, 2013; Offidani, Tomba, & Linder, 2013; 
Gustafsson et al., 2014; Halfon, Larson, Lu, Tullis, & Russ, 2014).  Other recent analyses of health 
inequalities have emphasized the complexity and multiplicity of the relevant causal pathways (Kelly 
& Doohan, 2012; Whitehead et al., 2016).   
However, the point of this article is not to offer a detailed assessment of New Labour’s policies, but 
to address the political core of Mackenbach’s argument: his assertion that “it is unlikely that a 
majority of the English electorate would have supported the substantial redistribution of income and 
wealth that would have been necessary” (p. 1252) to reduce health inequalities.  Assessing this claim 
offers a window into broader questions of the politics of reducing health inequalities by narrowing 
inequalities in people’s life chances and living standards.  Mackenbach concluded flatly that 
                                                          
1 Thus, one of the New Labour government’s major accomplishments was a substantial reduction in the 
prevalence of child poverty (Waldfogel, 2010).  It is not likely that substantial effects on many health outcomes 
associated with this reduction would have been observed within the government’s lifetime; it is also likely that 
the policies of successor governments will vitiate many of the potential positive effects. 
  
“reducing health inequalities is currently beyond our means,” even though pursuit of the objective 
should continue as a moral imperative (p. 1252).  The strength and quality of the evidence for 
redistributive policies as a necessary, although perhaps not sufficient, condition for reducing health 
inequalities is debated (cf. Schrecker, 2013; Kaufman & Harper, 2013; Preda & Voigt, 2015), but that 
debate is not explored here.  The reference to England reflects both the fact that England accounts 
for 533 out of 650 seats in the UK’s House of Commons and the ‘devolved’ context of current UK 
health policy; the strategy to which Mackenbach refers was an English initiative.  
Although the UK is admittedly an extreme case in terms of the pursuit of neoliberal policies 
(Schrecker & Bambra, 2015),2  such questions are of far more than parochial interest.   Indeed, they 
are fundamental to developing a political science of health inequalities - a project the importance of 
which has been identified by several authors (Bambra, Fox, & Scott-Samuel, 2005; Bernier & Clavier, 
2011; de Leeuw, Clavier, & Breton, 2014; Participants, 2015; Lynch, 2017).  Response to this 
challenge on the part of researchers has been limited.  Relevant work has tended to emphasize the 
content of official policy documents (e.g. Graham, 2009); the organizational structure of government 
and the views of participants in the policy process (e.g. Smith, 2013a; Smith, 2013b; Carey & 
Crammond, 2015; Lynch, 2017); or correlations among left-right partisan orientation, welfare state 
structure and health outcomes (notably (Espelt et al., 2008; Muntaner et al., 2011).  Much of this 
body of work arguably confuses explanans and explanandum, leaving unresolved the key questions 
of why particular official actors or electorates have the policy preferences that they do, and of how 
institutional frameworks influence the pathway from those preferences to the control of 
government.  Kaveri Qureshi's (2013) important ethnography of the English health policy process 
                                                          
2 Although not (yet) as extreme as the United States, for example with regard to the savagery of the 
latter’s health care financing arrangements, its use of punitive debt collection mechanisms (The new 
debtors' prisons, 2013; Kristof, 2016), or “hyperincarceration” (Wacquant, 2014) as a strategy for 
disciplining and managing the marginalized (former) working class.  
 
  
likewise found “that evidence was used by civil servants in accordance with their perceptions of 
what politicians conceive to be electorally palatable” (p. 10), thus directing our attention to the 
influences on conceptions of palatability. 
In this article, I explicate three perspectives on Mackenbach’s claim, which imply varying degrees of 
pessimism about prospects for reducing health inequalities in high-income jurisdictions with 
relatively functional democratic institutions.  Although explicated primarily with reference to the 
United States and UK, the perspectives have broader applicability in comparative research; the 
extent of generalizability across multiple jurisdictions and institutional contexts remains to be 
explored.  My analysis offers few answers, but rather an improved and more sophisticated way of 
considering questions of political feasibility that are critical to all of us committed to reducing health 
inequalities.   
Background: The post-2010 social and macroeconomic policy landscape 
In the UK context, Mackenbach’s skepticism about electoral support for redistributive policies that 
would address the underlying drivers of health inequalities appears to have been vindicated by the  
election results of 2010 and (in particular) 2015, when the Conservative party won an unexpected 
Parliamentary majority and with it the ability to pursue more effectively than under the post-2010 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats a “root and branch restructuring” of the UK’s economy and 
society, of which “[t]he longer-term goal is to shrink the state, free the market and set British 
political economy on a new course” (Taylor-Gooby, 2012, p. 61).  A decisive plurality3 of the 
                                                          
3 This terminology is used at several points in the text, reflecting the fact that under most electoral 
regimes, the proportion of eligible voters who actually decide electoral outcomes can represent a 
small proportion of the total electorate, especially in a first-past-the-post system with multiple 
parties like that in the UK – meaning, as an aside, that reference to “a majority of the English 
electorate” is in some respects misleading.  Low electoral turnouts and the unequal representation 
entrenched by the structure of institutions like the US Electoral College (which was the basis of 
Donald Trump’s presidential victory, after drawing almost three million fewer votes nationwide than 
his Democratic opponent) can further affect the composition of the decisive plurality.  Thus, the 
  
electorate apparently has had little trouble with a set of economic and social policies that have 
systematically redistributed income and wealth upward, with the most serious impacts concentrated 
among those people and places near the bottom of the economic distribution.  
On what might be called the vertical dimension, De Agostini, Hills, & Sutherland (2015) found that 
the combined impact of tax and benefit changes under the Conservative-led coalition government 
had been regressive across the income distribution as a whole; “under most sets of assumptions the 
main gains were in the upper middle of the income distribution and the main losers were at the 
bottom and those close to, but not at, the very top” (p. 5).  A later projection incorporating the 
effects of post-2015 changes concluded:  “By early 2021, [benefit] claimants are … expected to have 
lost a cumulative total of more than £27bn a year as a result of the welfare reforms implemented 
since 2010.  This is rather more than one pound in every four previously paid to working-age benefit 
claimants” (Beatty & Fothergill, 2016, p. 12).  The effects are not confined to benefit recipients, 
although they bear some of the harshest impacts: analysis by the Institute for Fiscal Studies finds 
that the combined impact of tax and benefit changes between May 2015 and April 2020 would cost 
households with children and no one in work an average of approximately £4,000 per year in 2020 
(Waters, 2017).   
 - Insert Figure 1 about here - 
On the horizontal or place-related dimension, policy changes have hit not only the poorest people 
but also the poorest and least healthy places hardest.  Local authorities (the smallest units of elected 
government) vary widely in the prevalence of deprivation as measured by a composite Index of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
distinctive characteristics of national political institutions add another, unavoidable layer of 
complexity to the political science of health inequalities. 
 
  
Multiple Deprivation; within the boundaries of a number of local authorities, no small areas4 rank in 
the UK’s most deprived fifth, while in others, notably cities hard hit by deindustrialization, more than 
half of small areas fall into this category.  By 2020-21, the cumulative impact of all post-2010 benefit 
reforms is estimated to cost the local economies of some of the poorest areas close to or more than 
£1,000 per working age adult per year (Figure 1), and “[t]here is a clear and unambiguous 
relationship:  as a general rule, the more deprived the local authority, the greater the financial hit” 
(Beatty & Fothergill, 2016, p. 24).   
Above and beyond the effects of benefit cuts are reductions in the central government grant that is 
a major element of local authority budgets (Subramanian, 2016).  These have had the biggest impact 
on authorities where premature mortality (at or before age 75) is highest (Taylor-Robinson, Gosling, 
Harrison, Khan, & Barr, 2013) - important not least because local authorities rather than the National 
Health Service (NHS) now have statutory responsibility for public health programs.   Many of the 
poorest areas are also the sickest, and  some of the regions where these cumulative impacts will fall 
most heavily are already poorer than any regions in France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Sweden (Eurostat, 2014).  Thus, at least in the 
UK regressive redistribution has a strong place-related element, conventionally (if rather 
simplistically) described in terms of a North-South divide (The great divide, 2012).   
These developments are occurring in parallel with a continuing crisis in the NHS and in public-sector 
social care, which is provided by local authorities (Humphries, Hall, Charles, Thorlby, & Holder, 2016; 
Maynard, 2017).  Elaborating on this would require a separate article; suffice it to say that financial 
strictures are debilitating many aspects of the NHS (Dunn, McKenna, & Murray, 2016; Campbell, 
                                                          
4 Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs): administratively defined spatial units with 1,000 – 3,000 
residents; there are more than 41,000 such areas in the UK. 
 
  
2016); major reductions in access to social care have been connected with a sharp increase in deaths 
among the elderly (Green, Dorling, & Minton, 2017; Maynard, 2017); and mainstream discussion of 
the future of the NHS now accepts “the inevitability of hard choices in healthcare” (Ham, 2017, p. 2) 
without much scrutiny either of the disabling (Campbell, 2015) if not homicidal (Green et al., 2017) 
impact of those choices or of the political choices driving decisions necessitating them (Leys, 2016).  
A minority with private insurance or deep pockets are unaffected by deterioration in the NHS; the 
impoverishing effects of having to self-fund social care are likely over time to affect a much larger 
demographic.  
In one respect at least the question of whether Mackenbach was right is problematic because it 
posits the electorate’s answer to a question that was not asked – certainly not in 2010 or 2015.  
Health inequalities did not figure prominently in the 2010 election, which was dominated by fallout 
from the 2007-2008 financial crisis. With Scotland as a partial exception, the 2015 election campaign 
that brought the Conservative majority to power was conspicuous not only in the lack of attention to 
health inequalities but also in the lack of any effective challenge to the Conservatives’ ascription of 
the post-2008 recession to past fiscal policy imprudence rather than to contagion from financial 
institution collapses in the US, or to the equation of economic competence with deficit reduction 
through selective, regressive spending cuts.  This was the case even though a mainstream Nobel 
Prize-winning economist, Paul Krugman (2015), was among many high-profile public challengers of 
the austerity nostrum.  For whatever reasons, Labour accepted much of the Conservative narrative 
and ran on a platform of austerity lite.    
We are therefore left to ask the counterfactual question:  had the large-scale redistribution to which 
Mackenbach refers been proposed, what would have been the electorate’s response?  The 
remainder of the article responds to this question, and draws out strategic and tactical implications 
for reducing health inequalities.  Subsidiary questions, important in terms of understanding the 
process of agenda-setting: why did no party (outside Scotland, where the Scottish National Party 
  
campaigned in part on an anti-austerity platform) venture such a proposal? Was it because they held 
a view similar to Mackenbach’s about the probable response, as suggested by UK protagonists 
interviewed by Lynch (2017), or because of other commitments?  The analysis that follows 
illuminates this latter set of questions only indirectly.  I identify three avenues of explanation that 
reflect, although imprecisely, different weightings of the relative importance of “the material and 
the discursive or ideational in driving political and economic dynamics” (Hay, 1999, p. 3).  The lines 
of argument are presented here in stylized form, and it cannot be emphasized too strongly that they 
are not mutually exclusive (Centeno & Cohen, 2012); each describes a dynamic that can be expected 
to operate in a range of political contexts. The relative importance of the dynamics in question in any 
given context has far-reaching implications for the political possibility of reducing health inequalities.  
Changing class structure and the “consolidation state”  
An argument grounded in “material” issues begins from changes both in the composition of the 
electorate, its interests and allegiances, and in the external environment – what one might call the 
frontiers of political possibility defined by neoliberal globalization.  Notably, the precipitous decline 
in manufacturing employment – a trend evident throughout the high-income world, albeit with 
substantial variation across nations – reduced the numbers and strength of the organized working 
class.  This is important because of the role of trade unions not only in raising wages and improving 
working conditions, but also as political constituencies for welfare state expansion.  Despite the 
‘offshoring’ of many types of manufacturing (Blinder, 2006), most familiarly to China (see e.g. Autor, 
Dorn, & Hanson, 2013) but more recently to various other jurisdictions that offer low input costs and 
flexible employment relations, the work once done to supply an expanding and seemingly limitless 
demand for goods as diverse as garments and iPads is still being done.  However as production is 
reorganized across multiple national borders, much of that work is done by people who do not vote 
in ‘our’ elections – or, indeed, in any worthy of the name.  As and when production has returned to 
  
former high-wage economies, it has done so in the context of radically restructured employment 
relations (see generally Booth, 2013; Sirkin, Zinser, & Rose, 2014). 
Philip Cerny (2000, p. 136) describes such transitions in terms of convergence on a model of the 
“competition state,” prioritizing “promotion of economic activities, whether at home or abroad, 
which will make firms and sectors located within the territory of the state competitive in 
international markets.”  The ability of firms rapidly to relocate or contract out production means 
that (re)distributional conflicts can no longer be contained, and need not be resolved, within 
national borders because of capital’s ready option of exit – constituting a dramatic change from the 
situation approximately pre-1980.  In the UK, this exit option combined with aggressive 
denationalization meant that: “Between 1979 and 1986 [alone] the UK’s 40 largest manufacturing 
firms increased their non-UK employment by 125,000 while cutting employment in the UK by 
415,000” (Hudson, 2013, p. 378).  The consequences were presciently summarized in 1994, in a 
conference volume edited by future Labour cabinet minister David Miliband, as “rising 
unemployment, growing income inequality, rapid expansion of a junk work sector employing low-
skilled labour at marginal wages, intensification of work, rising and growing pressures on social 
welfare benefits, a profound coarsening of social life in our cities, and more” (Rogers & Streeck, 
1994, p. 133).  Many of these trends have intensified over the two decades that followed.    
A second set of influences, which for the most part have been explicated in isolation from 
discussions of the globalization of production, involves the growth of government debt as a 
percentage of GDP across most high-income countries since the 1970s, against a background of 
relatively slower economic growth than in the early postwar period, while tax revenues stagnated 
after roughly the mid-1980s (Streeck, 2014; see also Streeck & Mertens, 2013; Streeck, 2015).  
Although the observation that governments use borrowing as a way of deferring distributional 
conflicts is nothing new (King & Gurr, 1988), the argument of Streeck and colleagues (see generally 
Schäfer & Streeck, eds., 2013), is distinctive and important in at least four respects.   
  
First, they emphasize that rising debt/GDP ratios cannot be explained with reference to increased 
redistribution; the increase actually occurred in parallel with welfare state retrenchment and rapid 
declines in trade union membership and strike action, and with an increase in income inequality.  
Thus, this is quite a different argument from the one that globalization has directly constrained the 
welfare state, which is empirically questionable in much of the pre-crisis high-income world.  
Second, they focus on the gap between government expenditure and tax revenue as a percentage of 
GDP, notably as a result of tax cuts that mainly benefited corporations and the ultra-rich (as in the 
case of the US post-2001).  They explain the gap partly in terms of tax competition and avoidance in 
a globalized environment in which both personal assets and corporate profits can readily be shifted 
among jurisdictions, which arguably represents an indirect globalisation-related constraint, and 
partly in terms of endogenous domestic resistance to increased taxation (on the latter point see 
Streeck & Mertens, 2013, p. 55).   
Third, they argue that the growth of government debt has resulted in a substantial shift of power 
away from citizens and elected governments and towards the investors whose aggregated portfolio 
preferences constitute the wisdom of ‘the markets’, and whose ‘confidence’ must be maintained 
whatever the costs in terms of democratic accountabilities (Streeck, 2015, p. 10-12).  This dynamic 
again is nothing new, and was identified well before the crisis of 2008 (Keegan & Pennant-Rea, 1979, 
p. 131-137; Harris, 1999; Sassen, 2003), but has clearly been magnified in its aftermath, ironically by 
the borrowing undertaken to mitigate the worst effects of the crisis.  Just as the competition state is 
organized around ensuring the profitability of direct investment, so the objective of the 
“consolidation state” is “to make a state attractive for financial investment by making it clear to the 
financial markets that the state is in a position to service its debt”, with austerity as the means to 
this end and rapid and volatile increases in the cost of borrowing as the price of failure (Streeck, 
2015, p. 10).   
  
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly for purposes of this article, Streeck and colleagues attribute a 
widespread long-standing decline in political participation to citizens’ recognition of the diminishing 
ability of governments to undertake redistribution and social protection, however legitimate and 
powerful the normative case, given the requirements of the consolidation state (Schäfer & Streeck, 
2013).  If “there is no alternative,” in Margaret Thatcher’s (in)famous formulation, then the 
restricted range of available political choices, and indeed the process of electoral choice itself, have 
limited appeal.   
Neoliberal hegemony and possibilities for policy change  
What if, within the constraints created by the global economic environment, there are (some) 
alternatives at least under conditions of formal democracy – in other words, what if the policy space 
(Koivusalo, Schrecker, & Labonté, 2009) available for redistributive action is more extensive than 
implied by the preceding discussion?  In particular, the account just provided fails directly to 
confront the possibility that domestic competition state polices are not pragmatic responses to a 
global environment that leaves few options available, but rather elite initiatives designed to use 
globalization as a justification for their own agendas, or actively to accelerate integration into global 
flows of production and finance on terms that would later be difficult if not impossible to reverse.5   
The account presented in the preceding section has other shortcomings.  For example, although 
convergence of tax rates is widespread, the pattern is stronger with respect to corporate taxation 
(Genschel & Schwarz, 2013) than it is with respect to personal income and wealth taxes.  This is to be 
                                                          
5 This point has been argued with special clarity by Sandra Halperin: “Globalization is a matter of 
deliberate organization and collective effort on the part of elites concerned to maintain a specific 
distribution of resources that subordinates labour and preserves elite privileges. The discourse of 
globalization emphasizes the necessity of governments to adapt to newness and difference, a 
necessity that forecloses choice. But government policies are designed, not to adapt to new 
circumstances, but to promote them” (Halperin, 2013, p. 224). 
 
  
expected given the relative ease with which transnational corporations can shift profits within the 
corporate structure in order to minimize tax liabilities (see e.g. Tanzi, 2001; Kar, Filho, & Akpokodje, 
2015; Clausing, 2016).  It is hard to make a credible argument that the massive reductions in 
personal income taxes for the rich in the UK under Thatcher and later the post-2010 Conservative-
led coalition, which took place alongside growing fiscal deficits and social policy retrenchment, were 
motivated by anticipated tax competition.  Still less can this be claimed with respect to tax cuts for 
the rich in the US under Presidents Reagan and later G.W. Bush.  Similarly, it is difficult to see the 
high interest rate policies of the US central bank post-1979, which had worldwide ramifications, as a 
response to globalization rather than a proactive effort to transform the economic policy landscape.  
Yet both sets of policies, i.e. high interest rates and tax cuts for the wealthy, are implicated in the 
rise of public debt (Streeck, 2014, p. 149).  And the consolidation state argument is much more 
persuasive with respect to countries of the Eurozone, which creates distinctive limits on economic 
policy space (Streeck, 2016, p. 113-141), than with respect to others. 
These observations imply that the choices in question could have been made differently by 
governments with a different set of priorities – whether responsive to different domestic 
constituencies or driven by different elite agendas.  Similar inferences can be drawn from differences 
in the prevalence of poverty after taxes and transfers, and of low-wage employment (Schrecker, 
2016), in countries that have “all been exposed over the last several decades to the same increases 
in globalization, technology, and competition within national product markets” (Appelbaum et al., 
2010, p. 5).   Such contrasts reflect broader divergence across a range of indicators of social justice 
(Schraad-Tischler, 2011), and arguably lend weight to Göran Therborn's (2006) assertion that 
“[n]ational rulers have no global alibi for national privileges and inequalities” (p. 49).   
That said, within specific national contexts such phenomena as tax resistance, tax revolt and the 
erosion of commitments to social solidarity may reflect powerful path dependencies associated with 
patterns of structural economic change, and with past policies that facilitated these, limited policy 
  
space, or increased economic inequality and other forms of stratification.  The consequences of 
joining the Eurozone are an obvious example.  In the case of the UK, after the transformations 
initiated under Thatcher and continued under New Labour and then the post-2010 Conservative 
restoration, transition to something like a Nordic model of social policy may simply not be electorally 
feasible because of the changed class structure of the society, and the corollary shifts in political 
allegiances.  A powerful version of this argument, organized around class coalitions and the electoral 
process, explains the politics of austerity post-2008 in the US and the UK with reference to a 
“constituency of the ‘squeezed but basically safe’” (Clark & Heath, 2014, p. 213), holding that “in 
hard times the exposed are more desperate for help than ever, but the majority ... have come to 
calculate that it is better to throw their lot in with the haves, than to risk being saddled with tax rises 
to provide assistance to the have-nots” (p. 202).   
 If calculations like those posited by Clark and Heath underpin the allegiances that drive electoral 
outcomes, are they accurate?6  What influences the way in which this constituency, and others, 
frame the relevant risks and probabilities?  Here we move into the discursive or ideational realm, 
and the focus of inquiry shifts to the possibility of altering that framing on the part of decisive 
political pluralities.  Central here is the nature of perceptions of economic ‘competence,’ which as 
many observers have noted is a prerequisite for electoral success (Hay, 2004; Gamble, 2012; Taylor-
Gooby, 2013).  When neoliberalism becomes accepted as normal or ‘just the way things work,’ the 
effect is radically to shrink the limits of permissible political discourse.  “[T]he higher-order 
assumptions of the dominant (neoliberal) economic paradigm seem to be accepted by all serious 
contenders for high office in contemporary Britain” – and, it must be added, in much of the rest of 
                                                          
6 And they may be wildly inaccurate.  In a post-mortem on the 2000 US election that brought George 
W. Bush to power, Brooks (2003) cites “a Time magazine survey that asked people if they are in the 
top 1 percent of earners. Nineteen percent of Americans say they are in the richest 1 percent and a 
further 20 percent expect to be someday.  This is cited along with much other relevant material in 
the important introduction to Streeck's (2016) How Will Capitalism End? 
  
the world – “for this is now taken as a token of their electoral competence and credibility” (Hay, 
2004, p. 503).  Without credible challenges to the equation of neoliberal policies with economic 
‘competence’, egalitarian redistributive policies (as contrasted with the inequality-magnifying 
policies characteristic of the UK post-2010) are highly unlikely to command sufficient support. This 
point is explored further in the concluding section of the article.   
Lessons from Brexit and Trump, or, What if all politics are identity politics?  
In the aftermath of the June 2016 UK referendum on European Union membership, the political 
significance of strong narratives that resonate with the electorate’s perceptions of reality, perhaps 
quite independently and in defiance of evidence-based calculations of gain or loss, cannot be over-
emphasized. This point emerges with even greater clarity in light of the 2016 US election, in which 
Donald Trump won the presidency based on strong regional showings, notably among portions of 
the electorate who were likely to be most immediately harmed by (for example) his promise to 
dismantle the Affordable Care Act (Congressional Budget Office, 2017)  
Such phenomena arguably call into question the assumption of voter rationality that, at least 
implicitly, underpins the first two explanations advanced here, and for that matter much of 
contemporary political science.  Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2016), drawing on decades of 
cross-national opinion research, posit two explanations for the rise of what they call populism, 
exemplified by the Brexit and Trump campaigns: the “economic inequality” and “cultural backlash” 
hypotheses.  They ultimately find cultural backlash explanations more persuasive, while emphasizing 
that “the analytical distinction … may also be somewhat artificial. Interactive processes may possibly 
link these factors, if structural changes in the workforce and social trends in globalized markets 
heighten economic insecurity, and if this, in turn, stimulates a negative backlash among 
traditionalists towards cultural shifts” such that “[it] may not be an either/or question, but one of 
relative emphasis with interactive effects” (p. 3). A thoughtful post-referendum analysis  based on 
  
multiple sources of survey data (Swales, 2016) concludes that although some demographic 
characteristics such as low income, lack of formal qualifications, living in rented social housing and 
being 65 or older were strong predictors of a leave vote, voters’ individual position on the left-right 
spectrum had little to do with their referendum vote, and “matters of identity are equally if not 
more strongly associated with the vote to Leave – particularly feelings of national identity and sense 
of [negative] change over time” (p. 7).  That sense of adverse change, of course, is not unrelated to 
economic situation.  
A stronger variant of this argument is made by Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels (2016), whose  
Democracy for Realists is closely argued and powerful, even if the authors are too ready to 
generalize from the US political context with selective use of examples from other jurisdictions.  The 
core proposition (to oversimplify) is that “partisan preferences and voting patterns [are] powerfully 
shaped by group loyalties and social identities,” such that “most people make their party choices 
based on who they are rather than on what they think” (p. 264).  They go on to argue, in a chapter 
on “the rationalizing voter,” (pp. 267-296), that voters may be actively indifferent to facts, instead 
viewing such basic and easily verifiable political claims as those related to the size and trend of fiscal 
deficits through the lens of their partisanship.  In the case of the 2016 US election, and arguably in 
the case of Brexit as well, favourably disposed electors had a great deal of well financed prompting 
to believe such “alternative facts,” in the now widely quoted Trump administration formulation.  In 
neither case did or could the prompting create the receptive audience; it merely appealed to existing 
frustrations – frustrations arising, at least in part, from a changing and uncertain economic context.  
At least an indirect connection with health and place is suggested by finding that, at a county level, a 
composite index of health indicators predicts a larger proportion of the electoral shift to the 
Republicans between 2012 to 2016 than the percentage of whites without a college/university 
degree (Illness as indicator, 2016), even after controlling for other factors (which as noted 
understates the magnitude of the demographic effect), with the largest swings concentrated in the 
  
US Midwest.  Many of the counties in question are territories where people increasingly find 
themselves living as refugees in their own land as a consequence of deindustrialization and the 
migration of economic opportunities, places where, to quote Bruce Springsteen (1980):  “You wake 
up and you’re dying/you don’t even know what from.”7  As voters recognize this, their appetite for 
any kind of respite from downward mobility and desperation may understandably be both ravenous 
and – especially in the absence of coherently and credibly presented alternative policy directions - 
undiscriminating.  This is far from the only explanation of Trump’s appeal to voters, and as noted in 
the final section of the article it may not be the most persuasive, but it would not be wise to ignore 
it.   
Conclusion: Critical tasks; future uncertain and volatile 
Each stylized response to the question of whether Mackenbach was right has important implications 
for political prospects for reducing health inequalities, and to restate a point, the explanations and 
what they imply are not mutually exclusive.  Historian Simon Szreter (1999) argues that “a cross-
class political alliance” made viable by rapid expansion of the franchise was responsible for advances 
in public health in England in the nineteenth century.  The first and second explanations explored 
here suggest the need for similar alliances today, yet In the UK, current electoral allegiances now 
appear to reflect an implicit coalition between plutocrats and an electorally decisive plurality of the 
so-called middle class, including the “squeezed but basically safe.”   
A provocative analogy may help in understanding the scale of the difficulty.  Historian Steve Stern 
begins his trilogy The Memory Box of Pinochet’s Chile by pointing out:  “After eight years of 
democratic rule that included credible revelations of human rights violations … a substantial 
                                                          
7 For a darker, pre-album version of the song “Point Blank” that is more explicit about the 
destructive impact of economic and social marginalization, go to: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kX8M_1r0LDs. 
  
minority of Chileans – about two of five – continued to remember the military overthrow of the 
elected government of Salvador Allende in 1973 as a rescue mission” (Stern, 2006, p. 7).  The 2009 
Chilean elections, in which the presidency was won by a billionaire beneficiary of the Pinochet 
regime against an uninspiring candidate of the centre-left, suggest the longevity of such allegiances; 
even in 2013, when the centre-left returned to power, the right’s candidates won between 36 and 
38 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections and the presidential runoff election.  The coalitions 
in question are not invincible, as the Chilean experience shows, but the consistency across decades 
of the “about two of five” proportion suggests their durability.    
The second line of argument suggests that creating compelling narratives that challenge the 
neoliberal equation of austerity with economic competence on its own terms, as well as from a 
social justice perspective (which may have limited appeal to tactically important elements of the 
electorate) is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for expanding support for policies that 
will reduce health inequalities (cf. Lynch, 2017).  Until the dogma that neoliberal policies are the only 
ones that ‘work’ (cf. Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002) can be challenged ‘on the ground,’ as it 
were, destructive consequences for health will continue to be accepted (especially by those not 
directly and immediately exposed) as collateral damage, inevitable as the price of avoiding economic 
peril.  Certainly the “social movement to advance the cause of health equity through action on the 
social determinants of health” that Sir Michael Marmot envisioned following on from the 
Commission on Social Determinants of Health that he chaired (Marmot, Allen, & Goldblatt, 2010) has 
seldom materialized.  This may be due in part to the difficulty of constructing necessary cross-class 
alliances, and in part to incomplete recognition of their necessity.        
Much is yet to be understood about developments like the result of the EU referendum and the 
election of Donald Trump, which are central to any assessment of the prospects for constructing 
cross-class alliances, so one must be more tentative here.  At the level of individual US voter 
preferences, race and attitudes towards race appear to be much stronger predictors of political 
  
allegiance than economic situation (Wood, 2017; McElwee & McDaniel, 2017).  This finding may or 
may not be relevant outside the US, but apparent mismatch between economic interests and 
political commitments underscores the importance of credibility, and the complexity of articulating 
in an electorally effective way the connections among the core propositions of neoliberalism, the 
policies that embody them, and their selectively destructive consequences for health outcomes.  
This enterprise might be described as a populism that speaks to those left behind by current 
economic trends and policies in a way that is progressive rather than retrograde; examples can be 
found in the UK media, although the discourse remains for the moment outside the political 
mainstream (Schrecker, 2017).   In somewhat different ways the three explanatory perspectives 
outlined here all direct our attention as engaged researchers and advocates to the complex, untidy 
and often unpalatable enterprise of political communication.   
 
Postscript 
The manuscript of this article was completed and revised before the UK election of June 2017, 
unexpectedly called by the Conservative prime minister when her party held a 20-point lead in some 
opinion polls.  In contrast to 2015, under new leadership the Labour Party ran on an explicitly anti-
austerity and modestly redistributive manifesto and, after a shaky start, gained enough 
Parliamentary seats to reduce the Conservatives to minority government status.  One should not 
read too much into this result as an indication of policy preferences, because the Conservatives ran a 
remarkably inept campaign.  Nevertheless, it does suggest that electorates may be more receptive 
to redistributive policies than Mackenbach believed; that relevant class coalitions are less stable 
than implied in the article; that electorates’ fatalism in the context of consolidation state pressures is 
not inevitable; that neoliberal ideas about the permissible limits of public policy can be questioned 
  
within the electoral process; and that, in the UK context, some connections between identity and 
political allegiance are malleable.  
The week after the election, at least 79 people died in a horrific fire in a London social housing tower 
block.  Investigations are ongoing; the use of flammable, and slightly less expensive, exterior 
cladding as a cost-cutting measure by contractors undertaking a refurbishment for the responsible 
local borough council (in the ultra-wealthy borough of Kensington and Chelsea) appears to have 
been an important factor, in turn enabled by deregulation and a lack of resources for inspection and 
oversight (Kirkpatrick, Hakim, & Glanz, 2017).  Having foregrounded not only the direct 
consequences of neoliberal policies (the expendability of certain lives) but also the depth and 
multidimensionality of class divides in the UK, the fire could reshape political narratives and 
conceptions of competence in a far-reaching way, even though casualty counts that can be 
attributed to other deadly manifestations of austerity are much higher.  In a macabre way, this 
prospect underscores the observations made here about the importance of political communication.     
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